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GOVERNMENTAL REFERENDUM ADVOCACY:
AN EMERGING FREE SPEECH PROBLEM
Governmental referendum advocacy-government adoption of apartisan position
toward a legislative measure submitted to a popular vote-has been criticized by
courts and may beproscribed by the ftrst amendment. 7his Note examines current
judicial responses to, as well asflrst amendment restrictions upon, referendum advo-
cacy. The author concludes that although citizens cannot beforcedto contribute tax
monies to support apoliticalposition with which they disagree, government advocacy
may well contribute to freedom of speech and informed decisionmaking--the very
rights which the first amendment was designed to protect.
INTRODUCTION
T HE USE OF THE REFERENDUM, the mechanism by which a meas-
ure proposed by a legislature or a segment of the population is
submitted to a popular vote,' may be one of the most significant
political developments of the decade.' In 1978, voters in twenty-
three states passed judgment on such diverse subjects as tax cuts,
gay rights, drinking ages, gambling casinos, public smoking, and
land conservation Indeed, if the recently formed Committee for
1. The term "referendum" is used throughout this Note to denote the "practice of
submitting to popular vote a measure passed upon or proposed by a legislative body or
citizen initiative." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961). It in-
cludes not only those legislative measures submitted directly to the voters, but also propos-
als initiated but already rejected by a legislature.
2. See NEWSWEEK, November 21, 1978, at 53; TIME, November 21, 1978, at 36; The
Plain Dealer, October 5, 1978, § 3 (Spotlight), at I; The Wall Street Journal, October 10,
1978, at 1, col. 3.
3. Id. Massachusetts, for example, has a highly developed legal scheme regarding
ballot measures, which includes four different types of proposals upon which its electorate
can pass judgment: (1) "Initiative," defined as "[Tlhe power of a specified number of vot-
ers to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection."
MASS. CONsT. amend. XLVIII; (2) "Referendum," the "power of a specified number of
voters to submit laws, enacted by the general court, to the people for their ratification or
rejection," Id.; (3) "Advisory Vote," a statewide, nonbinding referendum or initiative,
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 42b (West); and (4) "Public Policy Question," a nonbind-
ing ballot measure that appears only in a particular legislative district for the purpose of
advising a district senator or representative on policy issues." Id. ch. 53, § 19.
As do many states, Massachusetts restricts voter use of ballot measures:
No measure that relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions; or
to the appointment, removal, recall or compensation of or to the powers, creation
of abolition of courts; or the separation of which is restricted to a particular town,
city or other political division.., of the commonwealth; or that makes a specific
appropriation of money from the treasury of the commonwealth, shall be pro-
posed by an initiative petition ....
MAss CONST. amend. XLVIII, § 1.
The Constitution also prohibits measures related to the right to receive compensa-
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Direct Democracy4 has its way, referendum procedures will even-
tually be adopted by the federal government and al the states.'
The increased use of referendums is, however, troublesome.
In this age of media politics, money helps win elections 6 -and
money is available in large amounts to governments and corpora-
tions, both of which can and often do adopt a partisan position
with regard to a particular referendum.7 In theory, referendums
allow citizens to make objective decisions about proposed laws.
In practice, if a government agency or corporation, through the
practice of referendum advocacy, effectively determines what in-
formation voters receive, the decision made may reflect the corpo-
rate or administrative viewpoint, regardless of its merits. And,
tion for private property appropriated to public use; the right of access to and
protection in courts ofjustice; the right of trial by jury; protection from unreason-
able search, unreasonable bail and the law martial; freedom of the press; freedom
of speech; freedom of elections; and the right of peaceable assembly....
Id.
4. This Committee was formed for the exclusive purpose of encouraging states and
the federal government to enact laws establishing referendum procedures.
5. The Committee recently spearheaded a successful drive to create a referendum
procedure for the District of Columbia, and its hopes for future successes have been bol-
stered by surveys indicating that over 56% of the American people favor the opportunity to
vote directly on national legislation. See note 2 supra.
6. See H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS (1972).
7. There are approximately 300 corporations with assets in excess of $1 billion, while
approximately 100,000 corporations possess over $1 million in assets, and 1,000,000 corpo-
rations have access to resources in excess of $1000. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PER-
SPECTivE 152-59 (1976).
In 1977-78, 711 corporations had atfliated political action committees which collected
$10.5 million for their chosen candidates and causes. Similarly, 416 trade membership and
health organizations, which are amply funded from corporate sources, collected $10A mil-
lion to be spent in aid of favored referendums. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMW'N, FED-
ERAL ELECTION COMMITTEE REGULATIONS 15 (April 1977); FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N,
COMMITraE FINANCIAL AcTivrry 2 (1978).
The extent to which corporations have influenced the outcomes of referendums is
graphically illustrated by two states' experiences. California held a referendum asking
whether legislative approval should be required for construction of nuclear generating
plants. Amicus Curiae Brief by State of Montana at 9, First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) citing CALIFORNIA FAIR POLmCAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN
CONTmIBUTION AND SPENDING REPoRT-JUNE 8, 1976 PRIMARY ELECTION (1976). Dur-
ing the campaign preceding the vote, an organization called "Citizens for Jobs and En-
ergy" coordinated efforts to defeat the proposal. Of the total $2,771,804 raised by all
opponents of the measure, this committee raised $2,630,164, 96% of which came from cor-
porate contributions. Supporters of the measure raised less than $2,000,000, none of which
came from corporate contributions. The measure was defeated. Id.
In the same year, Montana also held a referendum on restriction of nuclear develop-
ment. Opponents of the measure raised $144,300, almost all of which was donated by
corporate contributors. Supporters of the measure, which was also defeated, collectively
spent $4,570.00. Id. The amicus brief relied on sworn statements contained in the files of
the Montana Commission of Campaign Finances and Practices.
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when corporations and state agencies dominate communication
channels, the marketplace of ideas is potentially depleted, voters
frustrated, and the legitimacy of referendum advocacy under-
mined.8
By 1977, twenty-nine states and the federal government had
passed laws limiting the political expenditures of corporations. 9
The Supreme Court, however, has included corporate election
spending within the scope of first amendment protections.10 In so
elevating corporate election advocacy, the Court not only under-
mined existing regulation of corporate referendum advocacy, but
also created a strong incentive for governments to participate di-
rectly in referendum advocacy, and provided a legal theory for
cloaking municipal speech with first amendment protection.
Thus, whether government referendum advocacy will eventu-
ally win acceptance is uncertain. The Supreme Court has, some-
what enigmatically, refused to rule upon its constitutionality,"
and lower courts, when faced with the issue, have reached con-
flicting conclusions.' 2
This Note examines current judicial responses to referendum
advocacy,' 3 as well as first amendment constraints upon govern-
ment subsidization of political viewpoints.'" It is hoped that an
articulation of the legal issues which have accompanied the ad-
vent of governmental advocacy will be the first step toward their
resolution.
I. FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. BELLOTrI:
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CORPORATE ADVOCACY
The Supreme Court's decision in First National Bank v. Bel-
lotti15 provides a logical starting point for an examination of gov-
ernmental referendum advocacy. Although Bellotti dealt with
corporate partisanship in the electoral process, the decision pro-
8. See generally First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Brief for Appel-
lee at 32-35.
9. Id. at 32 n.19; Brief for Appellant 9-10 n.6.
10. For a comprehensive analysis of Bellotti, see Fox, Corporate Political Speeck The
Effect of First NationalBank, 67 Ky. L.J. 75 (1978), and notes 15-27 infra and accompany-
ing text.
11. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 54-84 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 28-84 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 87-156 infra and accompanying text.
15. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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vides a framework for analyzing the legitimacy of governmental
advocacy.
In Bellotti, a number of banks and other business corporations
challenged a Massachusetts law that barred corporations from
making expenditures to publicize their opinions on any referen-
dum question that did not materially affect the business of the cor-
poration. 16  The Court did not discuss the extent to which a
corporation's first amendment rights resemble those of a natural
person. Rather, it undertook an exacting scrutiny of the matter 7
and held that the right to speak freely in the political arena cannot
be proscribed simply because the speaker is a corporation 8
Massachusetts maintained that the state had two compelling
16. Id. at 767. The law provided in relevant part:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety, indemnity, safe
deposit, insurance, railroad, street railway, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric light,
heat, power, canal, aqueduct, or water company, no company having the right to
take land by eminent domain or to exercise franchises in public ways, granted by
the commonwealth or by any county, city or town, no trustee or trustees owning
or holding the majority of the stock of such a corporation, no business corpora-
tion incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth and
no officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this section,
shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise to give, pay,
expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of aid-
ing, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any person to public
office or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any political party, or
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corpo-
ration. No person or persons, no political committee, and no person acting under
the authority of a political committee or in its behalf, shall solicit or receive from
such corporation or such holders of stock any gift, payment, expenditure, contri-
bution or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute for any such purpose.
Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be punished by a
fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
17. Under this analysis, in order to justify an infringement upon first amendment
rights, the government must show (I) that a compelling interest necessitates the legislation,
and (2) that the means employed have been narrowly drawn so that protected rights are not
unnecessarily abridged. 435 U.S. at 786.
18. Id. at 784.
With respect to the character of the speech, the Court noted-
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment's
protections. The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truth truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punish-
ment..... . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). The referendum issue that
appellants wish to address falls squarely within this description. In appellants'
view, the enactment of a graduated personal income tax, as proposed to be au-
thorized by constitutional amendment, would have a seriously adverse effect on
the economy of the State .... The importance of the referendum issue to the
1979]
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interests-first, in sustaining the active role of the individual citi-
zen in government, thereby preventing diminution of public confi-
dence in government, and second, in protecting the rights of
shareholders whose views differed from those held by corporate
management.' 9 The Court conceded that the first, justification
merited serious consideration but only if the state could show that
corporate advocacy so influenced referendum votes that demo-
cratic processes were "imminently threatened."2 Since the state
was unable to produce adequate legislative findings to clear that
hurdle, the argument was rejected.21 This is not surprising; the
Court indicated parenthetically that a government may not re-
strict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of
others.22
With respect to the state's argument that the statute protected
minority shareholders, the Court assumed arguendo that the as-
serted interest was compelling but nevertheless concluded that it
was an inadequate justification for abridging first amendment
rights. The Court was unable to find a "substantially relevant"
relationship between the interest asserted and the reach of the
statute.23 The Court concluded that the statute was both overin-
clusive and underinclusive. The Court said it was overinclusive
because it barred advocacy by corporations in which all share-
holders endorsed the corporate viewpoint 24 and underinclusive
because corporations could still adopt lobbying positions inconsis-
tent with minority shareholders' viewpoints.25
It is doubtful, after Belloti, whether any statute prohibiting
corporate referendum advocacy can withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. At a minimum, the state would have to demonstrate that
corporate expenditures on referendums foreclose effective individ-
ual participation. Given the exigencies of politics, this seems im-
possible. In some instances, no matter how much is spent in
support of a referendum, voters will reject it. If, for example, a
corporation spent millions of dollars advocating passage of a ref-
people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed. Its merits, however, are
the subject of sharp disagreement.
Id. at 776-77.
19. Id. at 787.
20. Id. at 788-92.
21. Id. at 79-92.
22. Id. at 790-91.
23. Id. at 792-96.
24. Id. at 794.
25. Id. at 793.
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erendum measure exempting businesses from taxes, voter ap-
proval would be highly unlikely.
Assuming that the impetus for regulation of corporate influ-
ence upon referendum advocacy still exists, but, after Bellotti, di-
rect controls on corporate participation are unconstitutional,
governments may seek more subtle methods of tempering corpo-
rate referendum advocacy.26 More importantly, whether wittingly
or unwittingly, by emphasizing the importance of first amendment
freedoms in the area of referendums,' the Court may have be-
stowed some legitimacy on the proposition that referendum advo-
cacy falls within the sphere of permissible governmental activities.
II. ANDERSON V. CITY OF BOSTON:
DODGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
GOVERNMENTAL REFERENDUM ADVOCACY
Anderson v. City of Boston28 is the only case in which the
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to address the permissi-
bility of governmental referendum advocacy. Even more so than
Bellotti, however, Anderson raises many questions but provides
few answers.
A. Anderson In State Court:
Avoiding the "Babel of Municipal Huckstering"29
In 1978, after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts de-
clared certain property assessment practices unconstitutional, the
city of Boston became legally obliged to assess residential and
commercial property proportionately.3" Discharge of the obliga-
tion would have resulted in a transfer of approximately $78 mil-
lion in taxes from commercial to residential properties. To
prevent this transfer, and the anticipated citizen flight from Bos-
ton that would accompany it, city officials decided to educate citi-
zens about individual tax savings should a tax reclassification
amendment be passed. Consequently, the Boston City Council
26. One such method is increased governmental referendum advocacy in order to di-
lute the effect of monies spent on publicizing corporate viewpoints. Such a race between
government and business to publicize views on an issue could conceivably flood the voters
with more information than can be assimilated.
27. 435 U.S. at 767. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
28. 78 Mass. -, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), stay granted, 439 U.S. 1389 (Brennan, Circuit
Justice, 1978), motion to vacate denied, 439 U.S. 951 (1978), appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 1060
(1979).
29. Fee id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 639.
30. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 630-32.
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enacted an ordinance submitted by Mayor Kevin H. White, au-
thorizing the expenditure of city funds for "the purposes of pro-
viding educational materials and disseminating information
urging the adoption. . . of a proposed amendment to the Massa-
chusetts Constitution relating to the classification of property for
purposes of taxation."'31 Subsequently, expenditures totalling
$975,000 were authorized for an "Office of Public Information on
Classification." Mayor White also made an additional $122,000
available for the statewide drive on the reclassification amend-
ment, including monies for polling services and education of vol-
unteers.32
Richard Anderson and ten other persons sought injunctive re-
lief against these expenditures. The Supreme Judicial Court
granted the injunction,3 3 which also prohibited the city and its
agents from compelling municipal officers and employees to so-
licit support for the amendment while performing their public du-
ties.34 In so doing, the court reached two conclusions. First, the
city lacked authority under the state constitution to expend funds
in support of the classification amendment. Second, the first
amendment, applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment, did guarantee Boston the right to appropriate funds
in support of a referendum.36 In reaching its first conclusion, the
court examined existing legislative authority in Massachusetts to
determine the legislative attitude toward referendum advocacy.37
The court construed the absence of any state statute regulating
municipal appropriation of funds in support of referendums as
authority for the proposition that such municipal activity could
not legitimately occur. The court said that existing statutory re-
31. Id. at-, 380 N.E.2d at 637.
32. Id.
33. Id. at-, 380 N.E.2d at 632.
34. The injunction read as follows:
The City of Boston, its agents and employees, are enjoined from spending the
funds appropriated by the city council on June 7, 1978, to meet the current ex-
penses of the Office of Public Information on Classification and are further en-
joined from making payments to Lee-Grigsby Associates or to Butcher-Forde
Consulting pursuant to the contracts between those entities and the City of Boston
.... This order should not be construed as implied authority for the city to use
municipal employees or to use other appropriated funds for the purpose of sup-
porting the proposed classification amendment. No municipal officer may be re-
quire[or compelled to devote time during his or her regular working hours to
solicit public support for the proposed classification amendment.
Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 632.
35. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 632.
36. Id.
37. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 632-34.
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strictions upon corporate expenditures may apply to municipali-
ties-but, if not, such statutes at the very least demonstrate
legislative intent "to keep political fund raising and disbursing out
of the hands of nonelective public employees and out of city and
town halls."38
In reaching the second conclusion, the court observed, in dic-
tum, that the first amendment may have no bearing when a politi-
cal subdivision disregards the supreme legislative authority of a
state.39 It did not, however, decide that question. Instead, it
stated that even should the first amendment apply, two compelling
state interests justified the imposition of restraints upon municipal
referendum advocacy.
First, the court noted that the state had a substantial interest in
assuring that the electoral process be fair.4° Since the legislature
had decided that this could be best achieved by a "hands off pol-
icy,"'4 1 the financing of public debate must reside exclusively in
the hands of nongovernmental persons and entities.42 Second, the
state had an equally compelling interest in restricting such advo-
cacy when voters-as they inevitably must--disagree on the mer-
its of a referendum measure. This justification guarantees that
dissenting taxpayers not be compelled to finance a viewpoint with
which they disagree.41 Unlike the corporate shareholders in Bel-
lotui,44 the plaintiff taxpayers in Anderson had no way out-the
additional revenues needed to finance the municipal appropria-
tions would be reflected in their taxes.45
The city won a stay of the injunction from Justice Brennan.46
In subsequent proceedings, a motion to vacate the stay was de-
38. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 634.
39. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 637.
40. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 638. Quoting Bellotti, the court said that the state may
protect that interest by prohibiting a political subdivision from partisan participation in
referendums provided that, in so doing, it does not abridge first amendment freedoms. Id.
41. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 639. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
42. 78 Mass. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 639 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
43. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 639-40.
44. See id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 640 n.19, and notes 23-25 supra and accompanying
text. The court, distinguishing Bellotti, noted that Anderson was more analogous to Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), in which the Supreme Court disallowed invol-
untary employee contributions to union politicking. For a discussion of Abood, see text
accompanying notes 112-27 infra.
45. 78 Mass. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 640.
46. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (Brennan, Circuit Justice, 1978). Jus-
tice Brennan listed two justifications for the stay: first, he speculated that four Justices
would vote to review the case, and second, in light of Bellott, Boston stood to suffer irrepa-
rable injury if not permitted to make the authorized expenditures. Id. at -
1979]
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nied4 7 and the case was finally dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question.48 In the interim between the denial of the mo-
tion to vacate and the final dismissal, the Massachusetts electorate
approved the reclassification measure. Thanks to the stay, the city
made the authorized disbursement of public funds prior to the
vote. Any evaluation of the impact which those disbursements
might have had on the outcome of the referendum is, of course,
conjecture.
B. Summary Dismissal of Anderson in the Supreme Court: A
Suggested Explanation
Uncertainty, of course, surrounds any dismissal for want of a
federal question. Several commentators have noted that only one
thing can be stated with certainty-such a dismissal represents a
decision on the merits.4 9 At any rate, a dismissal may occur for
one of several reasons: first, precedent indicates that the claim as-
serted presents no real controversy; second, the claim so lacks sub-
stance as to be frivolous; third, the claim is weak on its face and
has been presented at a time when the Court is overburdened."
As with any other dismissal for want of a federal question, it is
impossible to know which of these grounds triggered the Court's
dismissal of Anderson. Boston argued that the first amendment
guaranteed its right to engage in referendum advocacy.5' Ander-
son responded that state law precluded the city from so doing, and
that prior decisions of the Supreme Court precluded that Court
from reinterpreting the state law. 2 Alternatively, Anderson relied
on the Massachusetts high court's opinion that even if first amend-
47. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 951 (mem. 1978). Justice Stevens wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens rea-
soned that the subdivisions of a state were at the state's mercy with respect to the powers
they could exercise. He attacked the first amendment claim as frivolous-representing
nothing more than an attempt by Boston to seek a grant of power from the Supreme Court
that the state of Massachusetts could constitutionally deny. Id. at 347. In what ultimately
may prove to be the most significant point in this opinion, Justice Stevens stated, "Federal
questions. . . may also arise if a State authorizes expenditures to advance or explain a
particular point of view." Id. at -.
48. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060"(mem. 1979). Only Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Powell wished to note probable jurisdiction, thus shattering one of Justice
Brennan's two justifications for granting the stay in the first place. See note 46 supra.
49. R. STERN & E. GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcriCE 325 (5th ed. 1978); Note,
The Insubstantial Federal Question, 62 HARV. L. REv. 488, 490 (1949).
50. R. STERN & E. GROSSMAN, supra note 49 at 323-26; Note, supra note 49 at 490.
51. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 822 (mem. 1979) Brief for Appellant at
12-27.
52. Id. at Brief For Respondent at 8-12.
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ment protections included advocacy, compelling state interests ex-
ist to justify abridging that protection. 3
Thus, several conflicting explanations for the Court's dismissal
of Anderson emerge. First, Boston's claim of first amendment
protection was, the Court believed, without merit. Second, state
court rulings precluded Boston from asserting this claim at all.
Third, even if Boston's referendum activities were protected by
the first amendment, their abridgement was justified by a showing
of compelling state interests. Therefore, after Anderson, the ques-
tion of whether the first amendment protects or prohibits govern-
mental referendum advocacy remains.
III. LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF REFERENDUM ADVOCACY
The Supreme Court's dismissal of Anderson has left the legal
world in the dark with respect to the future of referendum advo-
cacy. Therefore, in order to formulate the legal issues which stem
from government support of political viewpoints, it is necessary to
take a few steps backward and examine the way in which lower
courts have treated governmental participation in the electoral
process. As the discussion which follows demonstrates, the re-
sponse has not been favorable.
In Stern v. Kramarsky, 4 the court refused to acknowledge the
presence of a first amendment question, 5 and prohibited a New
York state agency from advocating the passage of the equal rights
amendment. The agency, the New York Division of Human
Rights, had used money and personnel to campaign on behalf of
the amendment, which was to be submitted to the electorate in a
statewide referendum.5 6
The plaintiffs contended that the Division of Human Rights
had used public funds to disseminate propaganda in support of
equal rights for women. 7 In response, the defendant made two
major arguments, 58 namely, that the plaintiffs sought to abridge
53. Id. at 13.
54. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
55. Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
56. Activities in support of the amendment included (1) circulation of a memo to the
employees of the Human Rights Division asking that they help to educate the public about
the equal rights amendment, (2) a series of television broadcasts which promoted the
amendment, and (3) distribution of flyers urging passage of the amendment. Id.
57. Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
58. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff lacked standing, the court, however,
found that as a taxpayer and as president of an organization campaigning against the
E.R.A., plaintiff could maintain the action. Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
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agency officials' freedom of speech and association, and that the
defendants possessed statutory authority to support the amend-
ment.
The court quickly dismissed the first of defendant's arguments.
Reasoning that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant offi-
cials' support of the E.R.A. in a professional but not a personal
capacity, the court saw no first amendment issue. 9
The court also disagreed with the second of defendant's con-
tentions. The relevant statutory authority vested the Division of
Human Rights with authority to promote human rights. The
court concluded that this authority hardly sanctioned administra-
tive promotional activities in support of proposed constitutional
amendments.6 °
Although holding that a state agency may not use public funds
to disseminate propaganda, the court stressed that an agency may
appropriate monies to educate and inform the voting public.6
The court further emphasized that nothing in the opinion should
be construed to prohibit a governmental body from trying to in-
duce the public to vote in an informed manner.62 The line drawn
in Stern is a fine one. Absent first amendment restraints, it could
mean simply that governments wishing to engage in referendum
advocacy must do so with subtlety.63
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School District'
illustrates the problems that arise even when a statute appears on
its face to authorize governmental advocacy. In 1974, the Colo-
rado General Assembly passed a Campaign Reform Act. 65 Al-
though the Act included a provision barring political subdivisions
59. Thus the issue raised by the instant application'is not one concerning freedom or
association, but whether it is a proper function of a state agency to actively support a
proposed amendment to the state constitution which is about to be presented to the electo-
rate in a state-wide referendum.
Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 451, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
62. Id. at 452; 375 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
63. Accord, Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976)
(discussing the problems which arise in attempting to distinguish improper campaign activ-
ities from legitimate information expenditures). See also Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v.
Board of Educ., 13 NJ. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
64. 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
65. State and political subdivisions-limitations on contributions. (1) No agency,
department board, division, bureau, commission, or council of the state or any
political subdivision thereof shall make any contribution or contribution in kind
i campaigns involving only issues in which they have an official concern. In
[Vol. 29:886
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from making contributions to candidates,66 it also provided that
political subdivisions "may. . .make contributions or contribu-
tions in kind in campaigns involving only issues in which they
have an official concern."67
In October 1978, the Board of Education for Denver School
District Number One, a political subdivision of the state, declared
that the defeat of a proposed constitutional amendment, which
would have affected the authority of all levels of representative
authority in Colorado to spend public funds,68 was a matter of
"official concern." Consequently, the Board of Education ap-
proved the expenditure of funds to attempt to defeat the amend-
ment.69
A group of residents of the school district sought to enjoin the
Board from appropriating funds in an attempt to defeat the
amendments. The district court agreed. Resting its decision on
statutory grounds, the court concluded that the proposed amend-
ment was not of offcial concern.70 Even if it was, continued the
such instances, unless specifically approved by the governing board or legislative
body of the political subdivision involved:
(a) No public funds or supplies shall be expended or used:
(b) No employee or paid officer, other than the candidate, shall work on a
campaign during working hours or use any public facility or equipment in a cam-
paign during working hours;
(c) No transportation or advertising involving public property or funds shall
be provided for the purpose of influencing, directly or indirectly, the passage or
defeat of an issue;
(d) No employee or officer shall be granted leave from his job or office with
the public agency, with pay, to work on a campaign.
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 1-45-116 (1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. 459 F. Supp. at 358. The proposed amendment read as follows:
Shall the constitution of the state of Colorado be amended by adding a new arti-
cle x limiting annual increases in per capita expenditures by the state and its polit-
ical subdivisions to the percentage increase in the United States Consumer Price
Index, except when a larger increase is approved by the voters in the affected
jurisdiction in a special election; providing a procedure for emergency expendi-
tures; prohibiting the state from imposing any part of the cost of new or expanded
state programs on political subdivisions; requiring adequate funding of new and
existing benefit programs; and establishing a maximum limit on the surplus fund
for the state and providing that excess revenues collected by the state be returned
to the taxpayers?
Letter from General Counsel for Denver School System, Michael H. Jackson, to Gerald T.
Anglin (January 17, 1980).
69. The Board of Education specifically approved the use of school "supplies, facili-
ties, funds and employees" for distributing campaign literature, educating the voting pub-
lic, and providing public meeting places for those who sought to defeat the amendment.
Id.
70. Id. at 359.
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court, the first amendment would disallow any but nonpartisan
campaign efforts.
The court supported its conclusion that the proposed amend-
ment did not represent a matter of official concern by saying:
What is of "official concern" to a school district board of edu-
cation is to be determined by reference to the official powers
and duties delegated by the general assembly in the school
laws. A special election for the sole purpose of voting on a
school bond issue is a convenient illustration of a campaign in-
volving "only issues in which they have an official concern." A
proposed amendment to the state constitution on a general
election ballot is not such a matter. . .(even if it) would affect
the conduct of the affairs of school districts together with all
other state and local governmental agencies in Colorado."'7
The court then attempted to buttress its conclusion that the
proposed amendment did not constitute a matter of official con-
cem by arguing that such an interpretation would violate the first
amendment.72 The court reasoned that the government may not
take sides in an election because the selective use of public funds
in a campaign improperly distorts the workings of democracy and
contravenes the first amendment.73 More specifically, the court
said that if a governnient uses public resources to campaign
against a proposal supported by taxpayers who contributed to
those resources, the first amendment is violated.
[W]here the proposal in question-placed before the voters in
the exercise of the initiative power-seeks fundamentally to al-
ter the authority of representative government, opposition to
the proposal which is financed by publicly collected funds has
the effect of shifting the ultimate source of power away from
the people. Do not the people themselves, as the grantors of the
power of government, have the right to freely petition for what
they believe is an improvement in the exercise of that power?74
Mountain States' constitutional concerns are clear. The court's
invocation of precedent, however, is not. Mountain States pointed
to two decisions for the proposition that courts have uniformly
been reluctant to sanction governmental advocacy because such
advocacy raises first amendment barriers.7" An examination of
these cases, however, yields a narrower basis for prohibiting these
public funds in election campaigns.
71. Id. at 360.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 361.
75. Id. at 360 (citing Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1976); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
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In Stanson v. Mott, 6 the California Supreme Court was called
upon to construe the following statute:
For the purposes of disseminating information relating to its
activities, powers, duties or functions, the department may issue
publications, construct and maintain exhibits, and perform
such acts and carry on such functions as in the opinion of the
director will best tend to disseminate such information.77
The court concluded that the statute did not permit the use of
public funds to urge the passage of a park bond referendum.78 In
so holding, the court indicated that nothing in the statute "pur-
ports to sanction election campaign expenditures by the Depart-
ment of Parks and Recreation; in the absence of such explicit
authorization, we conclude that defendant could not authorize the
department to spend public funds to campaign for the passage of
the bond issue." 79
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
several years before Stanson in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v.
Board of Education.0 The statute at issue there permitted public
expenditures incident to "the building, enlarging, repairing or fur-
nishing of a schoolhouse. .... " The court concluded that these
words provided no authority for the school board to fund the pro-
duction of a booklet supporting a bond issue to finance expansion
of an existing school.82
The court reasoned that a fair presentation of the issue must
include all consequences of the proposal. In such a form, a book-
let addressing the financing of the expansion project would have
been a legitimate exercise of the board of education's power to
initiate the construction program. The booklet at issue, however,
fell short of that standard. It merely presented the viewpoint of
the school board and offered dissenters no opportunity to express
themselves equally through the use of public funds.8 3
Like the Stanson court, however, the Citizens to Protect court
provided an exception. It said that "[t]he expenditure [for ex-
horting a yes vote] is. . . not within the implied power [of a state
agency] and is not lawful in the absence of express authorityfrom
76. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
77. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5096.72(a) (Deering 1976).
78. 17 Cal. 3d at 216, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
79. Id.
80. 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
81. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18:7-77.7(b) (West 1976).
82. 13 N.J. at 179, 98 A.2d at 676.
83. 13 NJ. at 180-81, 98 A.2d at 677-78.
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the Legislature.' 4 Thus, in both Stanson and Citizens to Protect,
the courts based their decisions not on constitutional grounds, but
rather on the absence of specific legislative authority to spend
public funds in support of political partisanship. The reliance of
the Mountain States court on those two cases is somewhat dubi-
ous. The statute at issue in Mountain States explicitly authorized
the expenditure of public funds to persuade the populace to sup-
port a specific point of view in the voting booth when the matter
was an "official concern of the public body. ' s5 The advocacy in
Mountain States was barred not because of the absence of legisla-
tive permission but rather because the court concluded that the
outcome of the referendum was not an "official concern" of the
Denver Board of Education. 6 Such a strained reading of the stat-
ute is explicable only in the context of the first amendment hur-
dles that were raised expressly in the opinion and that are
discussed in the following section. Inasmuch as Stanson and Citi-
zens to Protect involved no legislative grant of authority to con-
tribute to campaigns at all, reliance on those cases in Mountain
States seems misplaced.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REFERENDUM ADVOCACY
In the absence of judicial consensus, the constitutional permis-
sibility of referendum advocacy is not clear. The only conclusion
that may be reached with any degree of certainty is that such ad-
vocacy, if constitutional, derives its legitimacy from the first
amendment.87 Therefore, in an attempt to clarify the relationship
between first amendment freedoms and referendum advocacy, this
section reviews the amendment's text,88 constitutional history,89
and selected case law.90
A. First Amendment Text
An argument, however slim, can be made that the text of the
84. 13 N.J. at 181, 98 A.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
85. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
86. 459 F. Supp. at 359; see text accompanying note 37 supra.
87. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (framing the issue as
whether corporate political expenditures are protected by first amendment freedoms); An-
derson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. -, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978) (holding that the first amend-
ment did not authorize a municipality to expend funds in support of a referendum
measure). See text accompanying notes 15-53 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 91-96 infra.
89. See text accompanying notes 97-104 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 104-35 infra.
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amendment does not prohibit-and perhaps even legiti-
mizes-referendum advocacy. The first amendment reads, in per-
tinent part, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .. ."I' The fourteenth amendment extends
this freedom of speech to all "persons." 92 Since 1886, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the term "persons" to include cor-
porations,93 a term which includes both business and governmen-
tal corporations.94 Thus, so the argument goes, the first
amendment extends its protection to governmental advocacy.
It can, however, be argued that a "person" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment does not include governmental cor-
porations. Business and municipal corporations are, after all, rad-
ically different. In a business corporation, individuals are
associated under a statute in a common enterprise possessed of a
common name, a legal capacity to sue and be sued, limited liabil-
ity, an elected management team, and a package of rights and du-
ties divided into units called shares.95 A municipal corporation,
on the other hand, has been popularly defined as a
legal institution, or body politic and corporate, established by
public law, or sovereign power, evidenced by a charter with de-
fined limits and a population, a corporate name and a seal...
and perpetual succession, primarily to regulate the ... terri-
tory or district incorporated by officers selected by the corpora-
tion, and secondarily, to share in the civil government of the
state in the particular locality.96
Thus, when the Supreme Court decided that the first amend-
ment protects corporate speech, it did not necessarily mean to in-
clude a governmental corporation.
B. First Amendment History
The relationship between the first amendment and govern-
mental referendum advocacy cannot be determined by simply
reading the language of the amendment. The history surrounding
its passage similarly provides no conclusive evidence on the
amendment's relationship to referendum advocacy. The court in
Mountain States relied in part upon Federalist Papers Numbers
91. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
92. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
93. Eg., Covington & Lexington Turnpike R.R. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896);
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
94. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF COR'ORATIONs 2 (2d ed. 1970).
95. Id. at 2-3 n.3.
96. E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 373 (2d ed. 1940).
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52 and 53 and a transcript of a speech by one Senator Rives to
conclude that the first amendment does not protect governmental
referendum advocacy. 97 Federalist Paper Number 52, in which
James Madison discussed the House of Representatives, contains
a review of the electoral process. It points out that the "federal
legislature should be independent of state legislatures and depen-
dent upon the people."98 Madison asserted that elections were the
only means available to ensure that the representatives were in
sympathy with and dependent upon the people.99
Madison may, indeed, have wished to restrain the power of
government. But, beyond suggesting that any exercise of govern-
mental power should be viewed with skepticism, Number 52 pro-
vides little indication that the first amendment bars governmental
advocacy.
In Federalist Paper Number 53, to Madison discussed the rela-
tive merits of annual and biennial elections. Some people appar-
ently felt that biennial elections would breed corruption of the
new democracy's representatives. Madison disagreed, and argued
that a two year term would allow representatives to become ac-
quainted with national needs.101 Thus, as does Number 52,
Number 53 suggests that the powers of the federal government
were intended to be restrained, but not that the first amendment
was designed to bar referendum advocacy.
The language relied on by the court in Mountain Statest °2 is
that of Senator W.C. Rives during an 1839 debate on a bill
prohibiting federal officers from interfering in elections. The
speech read:
The President of the United States has seen with dissatisfaction
officers of the General Government taking on various occasions
97. A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is that the
government may not "take sides" in election contests or bestow an unfair advan-
tage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our
country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental author-
ity would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies,
in office (see, e.g., Madison, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 52, 53; 10 J. Richardson,
Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1899) pp. 98-99 (President Jefferson)) the
selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of
just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.
459 F. Supp. at 360 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 557 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1976)).
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (J. Madison) 359 (Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 361-64.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 53 (J. Madison) 364 (Wright ed. 1961).
101. Id. at 360.
102. 459 F. Supp. at 360.
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active parts in elections of the public functionaries, whether of
the General or of the State Governments. Freedom of elections
being essential to the mutual independence of governments and
of the different branches of the same government, so vitally
cherished by most of our constitutions, it is deemed improper for
officers depending on the Executive of the Union to attempt to
control or influence the free exercise of the elective right. This I
am instructed, therefore, to notify to all officers within my De-
partment holding their appointments under the authority of the
President directly, and to desire them to notify to all
subordinate to them. The right of any officer to give his vote at
elections as a qualified citizen is not meant to be restrained,
nor, however given, shall it have any effect to his prejudice; but
it is expected that he will not attempt to influence the votes of
others nor take any part in the business of electioneering, that
being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and
his duties to 
it.103
According to the speech, Jefferson wished executive employees
to refrain from electioneering because of its potential impact on
the separation of powers and federal structure. President Jeffer-
son's concerns, as expressed by Senator Rives, did not reflect a
desire to protect first amendment freedoms. Jefferson may simply
have been preventing executive branch employees from under-
mining the legislative branch of government. If so, nothing in the
statement can be read to prohibit governmental referendum advo-
cacy.
C. Judicial Development of Frst Amendment Freedoms
Since neither constitutional text nor history defines the rela-
tionship between referendum advocacy and the first amendment,
this subsection examines major cases dealing with the first amend-
ment in an attempt to determine whether judicially developed
principles and policies provide an answer.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"°4
Though it deals with a libel question, New York Times de-
serves attention. It contains a detailed analysis of first amendment
values that the Supreme Court relied upon in the landmark politi-
cal speech case of Buckley v. Valeo . °5 In New York Times, the
Court had to decide whether the first amendment, as applied to
103. J. RICHARDSON, 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 98-99 (1899) (em-
phasis added).
104. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
105. 424 U.S. 1, 14, 49 (1976).
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the states by the fourteenth amendment, limited the states' powers
to award judgments in libel actions brought by public officials
upon a showing that the allegedly defamatory statements were
false.10 6 Before proceeding to the merits, the Court reviewed the
first amendment's underpinnings. In so doing, the Court set forth
five justifications for the first amendment: (1) to assure the unfet-
tered interchange of ideas in order to encourage political and so-
cial change, (2) to make government responsive to the people, (3)
to provide the people with the inner satisfaction of voicing their
thoughts, (4) to maximize, through a multitude of voices, the
chances for reaching correct conclusions, and (5) to protect the
government by allowing the people to vent their anger in a con-
structive way. 0 7
Debate on public issues, reasoned the Court, should be "unin-
hibited, robust and wide open."' 8 Preservation of these val-
ues-and the first amendment itself-required invalidation of a
state law permitting libel judgments in favor of a public official
upon a mere showing that the defendant's defamatory statements
about him were false. 10 9
Theoretically, one could attempt to determine the constitu-
tional permissibility of governmental advocacy by simply assess-
ing the extent to which such advocacy advances the five values
outlined in New York Times."0 This approach, however, would
106. The New York Times had published a paid editorial advertisement alleging that
police officers had mistreated blacks with the approval of the Commissioner of Public Af-
fairs of Montgomery, Alabama. The jury awarded the Commissioner a judgment of
$500,000. Id. at 256-59.
107. Id. at 269-72.
108. Id. at 270.
109. Id. at 278-79. The Court reasoned that allowing such a law to stand would restrict
the public's access to information by compelling newspaper publishers to be overly careful
in assessing what material to print.
110. Under New York Times, the first purpose of the freedom of expression is to en-
courage thought productive of change. By protecting speech (which, of course, provides
ideas and stimulates thought), the amendment facilitates a release of information that gives
its recipients the opportunity to fashion new ideas. The government possesses an extraordi-
nary capacity for accumulating and disseminating data. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J.
FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 318-24 (3d ed. 1973). Government
referendum advocacy, therefore, may well encourage the release of new information and
thus generate thought productive of change.
The second purpose of the first amendment, according to the New York Times court, is
to encourage government to be more responsive to those it governs. Speech allows citizens
to inform elected officials about citizen needs. It allows citizens, by way of the media, to
criticize, and urge the defeat of, officials who fail to meet those needs. Governmental refer-
endum advocacy may produce the same end.
The third purpose of the first amendment, under the New York Times formula, is to
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be unwise, for the opinion contains no standards for analysis. At-
tempts to predict the impact of governmental advocacy would
constitute no more than speculation.
The Supreme Court elaborated upon its reasoning in New
York Times in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,I" where the petition-
ers, a newspaper alliance, argued that the lower court had improp-
erly refused to apply the New York Times standard. 2
The respondent, who had been a senatorial candidate when
the alleged libel occurred, maintained that the New York Times
standard was inapplicable because the newspaper's defamatory
remarks had been directed at the plaintiff's private rather than
public conduct.' 13 The Court held that the New York Times rule
was applicable in Monitor Patriot reasoning that charges of crimi-
nal conduct could never be deemed to refer solely to private con-
duct when directed at a political candidate because such charges
bore directly upon the candidate's fitness for office. 1 4 To justify
its holding the Court stressed that the New York Times standard
had been adopted to ensure that tort law did not chill political
discussion." 5 The Court also noted that
[I]f it be conceded that the First Amendment was "fashioned to
assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people,"
. . . then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guar-
antee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office." 6
help the citizenry in reaching correct conclusions. People reach conclusions on the basis of
information. If there are no constraints on its flow, there is more information on which to
base a conclusion. Governmental referendum advocacy arguably increases the flow of in-
formation and thereby increases the likelihood that correct conclusions will be reached.
The fourth purpose of the first amendment as articulated in New York Times is to
ensure that citizens are afforded the opportunity to vent their anger. Since it seems that this
purpose is best accomplished when a citizen articulates his sentiments himself-and not
through his government-it is questionable whether protecting government referendum
advocacy advances this value.
The fifth value of the first amendment found in New York Times is to assure that citi-
zens derive satisfaction from voicing their viewpoints. Governmental referendum advo-
cacy furthers this purpose if one assumes that citizens similiarly derive satisfaction from a
government's use of tax monies in support of their viewpoints. Of course, this value would
be advanced only to the degree that the views espoused by government coincided with
those of its citizens.
111. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
112. 401 U.S. at 270-71. For a discussion of the New York Times standard, see notes
68-71 supra and accompanying text.
113. 401 U.S. at 273.
114. Id. at 274-77.
115. Id. at 275-76.
116. Id. at 271. See, e.g., Anderson v City of Boston, 78 Mass. -, 380 N.E.2d 678
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Thus, in Monitor Patriot, the Court once again demonstrated
its belief that the dissemination of information about candidates
requires the most exacting protection. In so doing, it implicitly
emphasized that the first amendment ensures that all thoughts on
political matters reach the marketplace of ideas. Thus, in con-
junction with New York Times, Monitor Patriot indicates that first
amendment guarantees might theoretically extend to and support
government participation in referendum advocacy.
2. Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court's opinion in Buckley v. Valeo " 17 may sup-
port the notion that the first amendment protects governmental
referendum advocacy. In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered
three issues concerning the Federal Election Campaign Act and its
amendments. 1 8 The first of these was whether the first amend-
ment permits a government to restrict campaign expenditures by
statute in order to ensure that all candidates receive the public's
attention." 9 The Court decided that such a statute was impermis-
sible: "That interest [equalizing resources] is clearly not sufficient
to justify the provision's infringement of fundamental First
Amendment rights."' 20 This statement, the impact of which pro-
tects first amendment freedoms at the expense of equalizing cam-
paign resources, may sanction governmental advocacy. If money
and power are interchangeable, the government cannot silence a
powerful speaker (another government) so that less powerful
speakers can be heard.
The second provision at issue in Buckley set a limit upon the
amount any citizen could contribute to a political campaign. 2 '
Again, the government argued that the need to give each citizen
(1978) (if Boston had not engaged in referendum advocacy, it is questionable whether Bos-
ton's citizens would have been familiar with the implications of a failure to pass a reclassifi-
cation amendment.
117. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a detailed discussion of Buckley, see Comment, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1976).
118. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26 and
47 U.S.C. (Supp., 1974).
119. This issue arose from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which set a
ceiling on the amount of personal wealth a candidate could use in a campaign for political
office. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974) (repealed 1976).
120. 424 U.S. at 54.
121. "No person may make any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candi-
date during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such
person during the year advocating the election or defect of such candidate exceeds $ 1000."
18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974) (repealed 1976).
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an opportunity to influence an election's outcome justified the
provision. Again, the Court disagreed, saying that "[tihe concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the first amendment." ' 2 This language may suggest
that the Court would not warmly receive the contention that gov-
ernment advocacy, to the extent that it drowns out other voices,
must be banned.
The third provision at issue in Buckley placed a ceiling on to-
tal expenditures by any one candidate seeking federal office.'2 3
The Court struck down this statutory limitation as well-and its
language in so doing is illuminating. In a democracy, said the
Court, "it is not the government but the people-individually as
citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and politi-
cal committees-who must retain control over the quantity and
range of debate on public issues in a political campaign."1 24
When coupled with the Court's intolerance of governmental
restrictions aimed at equalizing political voices, this quote pro-
vides a plausible argument that government lacks authority to
spend to equalize voices. Because the Court expressed such dis-
taste for the equalizing voices argument, however, 25 and because
the Court emphasized the desirability of a well-informed electo-
rate, 126 it is unclear whether after Buckley, speech loses first
amendment protection simply because the person delivering it is
the government.
3. First National Bank v. Bellotti
Two years after the decision in Buckley, the Supreme Court
decided First National Bank v. Bellotti 27 As already indicated,
the Court in Bellotti struck down a Massachusetts law banning
corporate expenditures on matters unrelated to a corporation's
business.' 28 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed the position it had
taken in Buckley' 29-- that the first amendment does not permit re-
strictions on speech in order to equalize political voices.' 30 The
122. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. IV, 1974) (repealed 1976).
124. 424 U.S. at 57.
125. Id. at 48-49, 54.
126. I1d. at 52-53.
127. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
128. Id. at 795. See text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.
129. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
130. 435 U.S. at 791.
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Court stated that, since speech deserves at least as much first
amendment protection as do speakers,13 1 corporate referendum
advocacy can be suppressed only when it threatens to undermine
democratic processes and first amendment interests.132
It can be argued that this reasoning applies as well to govern-
mental advocacy. Assuming that government advocacy falls
within the first amendment definition of "speech," it appears as
entitled to constitutional protections as does corporate referendum
advocacy. And, if governmental advocacy does not imminently
threaten democratic processes, there seems to be no basis for sup-
pressing it.
Under Bellotti, however, it can also be argued that, for this
very reason, the first amendment simply does not extend to gov-
ernmental advocacy. Such advocacy may well threaten demo-
cratic processes. Indeed, if one accepts the premise that
government neutrality is essential to a democracy, such a proposi-
tion is difficult, if not impossible, to refute.
Notwithstanding this potential argument, Bellotti provides
strong support for the contention that governmental referendum
advocacy deserves first amendment protection. First, it reaffirms
Buckley's rejection of the equalizing voices argument. 133 Second,
it emphasizes that both speech and speakers deserve first amend-
ment protection.' 34 Third, by placing a heavy burden of proof
upon the state to justify a statutory restriction upon speech, 35 Bel-
lotti makes it more difficult to argue that such advocacy jeopar-
dizes political processes.
V. CITIZEN CONSENT: A PROPOSED PREREQUISITE TO
GOVERNMENTAL ADVOCACY
In 1977, holdings in two Supreme Court cases, Wooley v. May-
nard 36 and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,137 set limits
131. It is the type of speech indispensible to decisionmaking in a democracy, and
this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacityfor informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.
Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 789-90. The Court did not, however, identify the ways in which corporate
referendum advocacy could threaten democratic processes.
133. Id. at 790-91.
134. Id. at 777. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 786-88.
136. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
137. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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upon a government's power to use taxpayer's funds to advance a
particular point of view. In so doing, they may have, in a some-
what paradoxical fashion, conferred a legitimacy upon govern-
mental advocacy to which the populace freely consents.
In Wooley, two Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of violat-
ing a New Hampshire statute by covering the motto on their li-
cense plate which read, "Live Free or Die."'131 The Maynards
argued that the state could not force them to advertise a slogan
they found "morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhor-
rent." 3 9 The Supreme Court agreed. It held that a state may not
"constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dis-
semination of an ideological message by displaying it on his pri-
vate property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
read and observed by the public."'
140
In reaching its holding, the Court concluded that New Hamp-
shire's treatment of the respondents encroached upon their first
amendment rights. 14 ' The Court pointed out that under its deci-
sion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,142 the
first amendment protects not only the right to proselytize ideologi-
cal causes but also the right to refuse to foster such causes. 143 The
Court then determined that New Hampshire's interest in promot-
ing administrative convenience and civic values was not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify abridgement of a particular
individual's rights.'"
138. 430 U.S. at 707. This case did not, however, come to the Court as an appeal from
a criminal conviction. Rather, following a conviction for violating a law prohibiting cover-
ing the state motto on a license plate, the appellee filed suit in federal district court to
obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 709 n.5.
139. Id. at 713.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 714-15.
142. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the Court held that requiring unwilling children
to salute the flag constitutes a violation of the children's right of freedom of expression.
Justice Jackson's famous opinion reads, in part:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
our constitution to reserve from all official control
Id. at 642.
143. 430 U.S. at 714.
144. Id. at 716-17.
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Although the Court in Wooley took pains to explain the way
in which the first amendment prevents the government from forc-
ing a person to expound certain views, it would be an overstate-
ment to suggest that the case necessarily precludes governmental
advocacy. Nonetheless, Wooley does suggest that when the gov-
ernment uses tax money to advance a point of view, it may effec-
tively force a taxpayer to support that point of view. Thus, in a
case like Wooley, where the state could not justify its advocacy by
showing a compelling interest, it must provide some method to
ensure that taxpayers do not subsidize views which they do not
endorse.
One method to ensure that a state used only those funds for-
warded with the intent to subsidize a particular referendum is to
use a tax form checkoff system. Under such a system, any citizen
wishing to donate a sum for governmental advocacy would so in-
dicate in a space provided on his tax return. Under such a plan,
only the money actually checked off by taxpayers could be spent
by the government, and there would be no problems with coercion
or tacit approval.145
The Court elaborated on Wooley in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education. 146 The appellants in Abood were employed by the De-
troit Board of Education under an "agency shop arrangement."' 47
The appellants maintained that payments exacted from them in
lieu of union dues were being used to support political candidates
and causes in violation of their first amendment freedom of asso-
ciation. 48 Thus, the major issue was whether the first amendment
would permit the school board to dismiss employees who refused
to pay service fees to be used for political purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining. 141
The Court pointed out that if this question were answered in
the affirmative, employees would be deprived of government em-
ployment on the ground that they refused to advance a point of
145. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.
1978) (holding that a reverse checkoff procedure, which required a member of an organiza-
tion who did not wish to make a political contributidn to take affirmative steps to prevent
the contribution, violated the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).
146. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
147. Under an agency shop arrangement, a union and the local government employer
agree that each employee represented by a union (though not necessarily a union member)
pay to the union, as a condition of employment, an amount equivalent to union dues. Id.
at 211.
148. Id. at 234.
149. Id.
[Vol. 29:886
GOVERNIMENTAL REFERENDUM ADVOCACY
view. 150 Such a result, said the Court, would violate both the prin-
ciple of freedom of association and the principle that "an individ-
ual should be free to believe as he will and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the state." 15'
Consequently, the Court held that any employee of the school
board threatened with discharge for failing to make the types of
political contributions in question could establish a cause of action
under the first and fourteenth amendments. 152 By so holding, the
Court reaffirmed Wooley and provided additional support for the
argument that a government cannot use a nonconsenting tax-
payer's funds for referendum advocacy.
The third part of the Abood opinion reviewed two possible
remedies for a first amendment violation in the context of political
expenditures. 15 3 First, that portion of the exacted funds in the
proportion that union political expenditures bear to total expendi-
tures could be refunded, and future assessment similarly re-
duced.154 Second, such expenditures could simply be enjoined.' 55
With reference to taxes, a court adopting the Abood approach
could use these remedies to grant relief to a citizen compelled to
support views with which he disagreed. As Abood designated
such remedies to be the minimum relief available, 5 6 one might
conclude that the only way to bar coerced contributions would be
to bar all advocacy. This approach, however, by limiting both the
right of citizens to fund advocacy and the right of government to
engage in advocacy, would seem to be unnecessarily restrictive. A
better view is that, under Wooley and Abood, governments can
engage in referendum advocacy as long as each citizen retains the
right to refuse to contribute his individual tax monies to the effort.
Neither existing law nor the first amendment yield any certain
answers to the question of governmental referendum advocacy. It
is submitted, in conclusion, that government can engage in such
advocacy if it does not force an individual citizen to subsidize
150. Id. at 236.
151. Id. at 235.
152. Id. at 237.
153. Id. at 237-42.
154. Id. at 240 (citing Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113,
122 (1963)).
155. Id. at 238.
156. Id. at 240.
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views with which he disagrees. Indeed, citizen consent to govern-
ment referendum advocacy alows a maximum of voices to be
heard-and a premium on informed decisionmaking.
GERALD T. ANGLIN
